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1. Two trends in the New Economy 
 
Many authors (for instance Mendelson and Pillai 1999, 
Zenger 2002) find evidence that an increasing number of firms are 
experimenting with new forms of organizing transactions in the New 
Economy. More precisely we are witnessing two kinds of 
transformation process within firms (type I and type II) that take 
place in parallel.  
On the one hand, the firm is becoming more and more 
infused with high-powered incentives, i.e., firms are moving towards 
more market-like solutions to organizational problems. This induces, 
as I will argue in more detail later, changes in the organizational 
structure of firms, which involves flattening, delayering, using 
stronger performance pay incentives, empowering employees, ceding 
authority and so on. As shown in Figure 1, type I transformation 
leads to the organization of work within the firm in semi-autonomous 













Figure 1. Type I transformation process 
Adaptation from Zenger and Hesterley (1997) 
 
On the other hand, firms are changing their scope of activities, 
typically refocusing on their core businesses and outsourcing many 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference "Economie 
de la firme: quelle nouveautés?", 17-18 April, 2003, Annecy, France. I 
am grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and 
constructive criticism. 
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of the activities that they previously regarded as central. They are 
building up long-term relationships in the market and taking 
advantage of networking. Supplier programs, strategic alliances, 
networks, subcontracting, joint research and development activities 
are examples of such relationships. Clearly, these long-term 
contracts between firms differ to a significant extent from the spot 
market relationships. In the literature these organizational forms are 
commonly referred to as hybrids (Williamson 1991, Ménard 2004) 
and their proliferation as the “swollen middle” (Hennart 1993). Figure 
2 shows how autonomous firms are becoming more and more 














Figure 2: Type II transformation process  
Adaptation from Zenger and Hesterley (1997) 
 
Although both tendencies concern the firm, they must be 
clearly distinguished: while the type I transformation occurs within 
the boundaries of the firm, type II transformation leads to a shift 
from one organizational form to another, namely from a firm to a 
hybrid organization.  
In this paper I am concerned with the type I transformation. I 
will analyze the organization of the firm in the New Economy, in 
comparison with that in the Chandlerian economy, rather than 
analyzing discrete organizational forms (firms, markets and 
hybrids)4. While the latter issue is addressed in the theory of the 
 
3 Note that the process as shown in Figure 2 looks as if it originated in the 
market. However, this is not in contradiction with what I am arguing below. 
For instance, when firms are outsourcing their activities new relationships 
are established between firms, which is a market phenomenon. But, in fact, 
these new relationships result from firms’ decision on outsourcing, i.e., the 
whole process is rooted inside the firm.   
4 In this paper I distinguish between organizational forms based on the 
allocation of decision rights, and take the Williamsonian term of governance 
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firm, the former, surprisingly, is rather neglected. However, an 
explanation for these alternative firm organizations, which I call 
mutants, must also be incorporated into the theory of the firm.5 
Contrary to the theory of the firm, organizational theory literature 
deals with this issue, but there is a conceptual problem with the way 
this literature treats these types of firm organizations. The point is 
that the organizational theory literature very often refers to these 
firm organizations as “new organizational forms”6. I am opposed to 
this view and will argue that these forms should be regarded as a 
new mutant of a firm7. The important thing is that the “essence” of 
the firm still remains the same in the New Economy. Accordingly, the 
end of the “Coasean firm”8 is simply a myth.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for the 
nature and emergence of the New Economy’s mutant-firm shown in 
Figure 1. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes 
the main characteristics of the mutant-firm in the New Economy. 
Section 3, by paralleling the New Economy mutant with the 
multidivisional firm, addresses the issue of why the New Economy 
leads to a new mutant form. Section 4 analyzes the distinctive 
feature of a firm. Section 5 deals with the question of how far the 
New Economy mutant can go in applying market-like coordinating 
devices. Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. A closer look at the new mutant-firm 
 
Unfortunately, empirical work on organizational structure is 
relatively limited, Rajan and Wulf (2003) being one of the few 
exceptions.9 In their investigation they used a panel of more than 
300 publicly traded US firms over the years 1986-1999. The study 
focused on two measures of organizational structure: the breadth 
and depth of the hierarchy. Breadth is represented by the CEO’s 
span of control and is defined as the number of positions reporting to 
 
5 This is in accordance with the proposition of Rathe and Witt (2001) 
according to which the theory of the firm should also address the 
developmental (dynamic) versions of the original three Grand Questions. The 
question of what role change plays in the nature of the firm is one such 
version. 
6 Daft and Lewin (1993) established the term “new organizational form” by 
simply referring to a new phenomenon, without clearly defining the concept. 
Drucker (1988) also emphasizes “The Coming of the New Organization”.  
7 The multidivisional firm is another mutant; that is why I refer to the form 
in question as a new one. This issue will be discussed at a greater length 
below. 
8 In the “Coasean firm” authority relations constitute its very essence. I will 
discuss this issue in Section 4. 
9 Another significant work is Waytt Data Services (1991). 
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the CEO. Depth represents a vertical dimension of the hierarchy and 
is defined as the number of positions between the CEO and the 
divisional CEO. Their first finding is that the number of managers 
reporting to the CEO has increased steadily over time. The second 
finding is that the depth, which is the number of positions between 
the CEO and the lowest managers with profit center responsibility, 
has decreased.10 As regards the second finding, which is my concern 
here, a possible interpretation is that the organizational hierarchy is 
becoming flatter, even while authority is being delegated down the 
organization.11 Besides this exhaustive study, many provide evidence 
for the decrease in the extent of vertical integration (Carlsson and 
Taymaz 1994), or downsizing (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 2002). 
These empirical facts underpin the view that the process 
shown in Figure 1 is a significant trend, at least in the American 
economy. What are the major features of the “outcome” of the type I 
transformation? Since the mutant-firm is emerging in a process of 
change, its characteristics, inevitably, can only be stressed in terms 
of opposition to the structure that prevailed before the change. Here 
the questions of what the old structure is and what it looks like can 
be raised. My argument is that the old organizational structure, 
which, indeed, has dominated since the 1960s, is the Chandlerian 
multidivisional corporation12 (M-form). Let me summarize the 
defining characteristics of this corporation (Chandler 1977, 1990, 
Rajan and Zingales 2000). It is (1) large enough to exploit potential 
economies of scale and scope in production, (2) physical capital-
intensive, (3) integrated both forward and backward, (4) oligopolistic, 
(5) run by professional managers which leads to the agency problem 
between owners and managers, (6) structured into profit centers 
 
10 The results of Rajan and Wulf’s research are rather general in the sense 
that their sample does not represent particular industries such as 
telecommunications, information technology, or biotechnology which are, 
erroneously, very often equated with the New Economy like in Daveri (2002). 
In this sense, a flattening organization, decentralization of decision-making 
authority, and the elimination of middle-management layers are common in 
the whole US economy, and should not by any means, be explained 
exclusively by the emergence of particular new industries. 
11 Note that as a result of a flatter hierarchy both centralization and 
decentralization could be strengthened. In the sense that the CEO is 
building direct connections at a deeper level in the organization 
centralization is stronger. On the other hand, decision-making authority is 
also being pushed further down, which is a form of decentralization (Rajan 
and Wulf 2003). 
12 The historical development of the multidivisional form is described in 
Chandler’s seminal work (Chandler 1977); this is why it is also referred to as 
Chandlerian firm. Through the lens of American business history he has 
given a detailed report on how the multidivisional form evolved through time 
and became a dominant form in the 1960s.  
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whose contributions to corporate profit are both directly observable 
and measurable, and, who are given relatively large autonomy and 
day-to-day operating decision-making rights.  
As opposed to this, the novel organizational structure 
encompasses a flatter hierarchy – a decentralized decision structure, 
which is built on self-organizing autonomous teams. These project-
based teams are organized cross-functionally around a well-defined 
task, observable output or project (Zenger 2002), comprising a mix of 
individuals with highly specialized competences. Rather than 
measuring the individuals’ performance, the new mutant-firm 
measures the output of the teams and rewards them. That is, the 
group functions under market-like control, like an external 
subcontractor (Helper et al. 2000). The team structure has a 
profound impact on the sequence of operations: the traditional 
sequence of research, development, manufacturing, and marketing is 
being replaced by synchrony since specialists from all these 
functions work together as a team (Drucker 1988). The role of 
managers has also changed: they exercise guidance, manage conflict 
situations and enable communication among the teams rather than 
directly commanding and controlling them (Child and McGrath 
2001). Tasks are fuzzily defined compared to the M-form, and as a 
consequence the corporate centre can take advantage of the teams’ 
entrepreneurship and responsibility. Due to the fact that employees 
are specialists, human capital and knowledge are becoming 
increasingly important relative to inanimate assets. As the 
importance of human capital grows, power also moves away from the 
top and is much more widely dispersed through the firm.13 The 
character of specialization has also been changed (Rajan and 
Zingales 2000): while the employees of the Chandlerian firm are 
technically specialized to the firm, those of the new mutant have 
firm-specific capabilities. 
More importantly, authority changes in character14: a high 
degree of discretion is granted to lower levels. As a result, the new 
mutant form tends to be not only strongly decentralized, but also 
quite loosely coupled. Briefly, the New Economy’s mutant-firm15 
 
13 Control over valuable human capital seems to be a greater source of power 
than control over physical assets since almost all rights over it are residual, 
i.e., not allocable through contract (Rajan and Zingales 2000). 
14 I will emphasize later that, although authority changes, it remains a 
distinguishing feature of the firm; and that is the reason why the new firm 
organization must be considered a mutant of a firm, rather than a “new 
organizational form”. This means that authority is the key in my 
argumentation. 
15 Since there is no established terminology as regards this firm 
organization, due to a diversity of the forms themselves, I prefer not to use 
any particular term. 
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relies more on high-powered incentives that are often seen as 
“virtues” of the market. Table 1 explores the main differences 
between the Chandlerian firm and the New Economy mutant.  
 
Criterion M-form New Economy Mutant 
Structure Vertically integrated 




• Hierarchy (vertical 
relationships) 
• Leaders control, 
monitor and set 
specific and 
concrete objectives 
through the use of 
formal authority 
• Clear role 
definitions 
• Formal rules 
Disintegrated  
• Decentralized goal setting 
• Distributed power 
• Teams and work groups 
(horizontal relationships) 












• Fuzzy role definitions 
• Informal rules 
Critical Asset • Inanimate (physical) 
capital 
• Human capital 
Specialization • Technical • Firm-specific 
Source of Power • Control over physical 
assets 
• Individual’s valuable resource 
Economies • Economies of scale and 
scope 
• Economies of scope 
• Modularity 
Demand • Undifferentiated 
products 
• Distinctive and individualized 
Firm Boundary • Boundaries clearly 
specified and durable 
• Boundaries permeable and fuzzy 
• Quasi-contractual inter-teams 
relationships 
Reward • Based on individual 
performance 
• Based on team performance 
Transaction 







• Low • High 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the Chandlerian firm with the New 
Economy’s mutant-firm 
 
3. The New Economy and the new mutant 
 
My argument is that the above-described form must be 
considered a new mutant of a firm, which we should understand in 
line with the M-form put forward by Chandler (1977). This flows from 
the fact that the firm is subject to a slow evolution process which 
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produces new mutants at various times. In what follows I will explore 
how and why the New Economy leads to the emergence of a new 
mutant, which, indeed, requires an understanding of the New 
Economy itself.  
Most authors agree that the term New Economy captures the 
important shift in the US economy that took place in the 1990s, 
although opinions differ about the nature of this shift.16 According to 
Foss (2002) the major effect consists in the fact that knowledge has 
become increasingly dispersed in the sense of Hayek (1945). D’Aveni 
(1994) puts the emphasis on the acceleration of the speed of 
innovation and of technological development, which changes the 
character of competition.17 Another important change is to be found 
in the differentiation of consumers’ preferences, which leads to 
customization (Da Silveira et al. 2001). 
Thus, all these authors shed light only on a particular aspect 
of the New Economy. Togati (2003) proposes a broader definition. The 
point is that the New Economy is a complex phenomenon, 
comprising a number of phenomena such as the above-mentioned 
features, or additionally IT, globalization, the increasing weight of 
finance, more intense competition and so on. It is clear that all these 
features must be taken into account, rather than focusing on one 
factor taken in isolation. On the other hand, as Togati (2003) argues, 
the New Economy concerns a historical process capturing permanent 
and structural effects. In this light, it may be paralleled with the 
process Chandler (1977) has described. The crucial point is that the 
New Economy is a continuity of the Chandlerian process and does 
not represent the third industrial revolution. The thing is that 
technological progress interacts with a number of other factors, such 
as fundamental institutions, which may be relatively stable through 
time. A true revolution occurs only when technology is able to affect 
these factors as well (Togati 2003). The New Economy is not a 
revolution since it occurs within a broad institutional framework 
which was constructed between the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century.18 What is the significant difference 
between the New Economy and the Chandlerian economy? The 
novelty of the New Economy lies in the combination of its individual 
 
16 Numerous scholars (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 1994) argue that the process 
of change characterizing the New Economy occurs most markedly in the US 
economy, but, even in the US it is somehow geographically concentrated; 
and Europe is reckoned to lag behind the US (Daveri 2002). 
17 This new type of competition is referred to as a hypercompetition. The 
point is that on the one hand, the competitive advantages persist for shorter 
periods, and on the other hand disturbances are frequent (D’Aveni 1994). 
18 Alternatively, the New Economy is also referred to as the entrepreneurial 
economy, and the Chandlerian economy as the managed economy 
(Audretsch and Thurik 2000). 
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ingredients and the acceleration of technological change (Togati 
2003). In other words, the New Economy accelerates some 
tendencies that started at the mid of the 20th century; accordingly, 
the tendency itself is not a new one. 
The consequences are the transformation processes shown in 
Figure 1 and 2. On the one hand, there is a shift to the market 
(Figure 2) which is characterized by Langlois (2003) as a vanishing 
hand in which the coordination by management (visible hand) is 
replaced by market coordination (invisible hand). This process “from 
Adam Smith to present has been characterized by a continual 
substitution of large organizations for the markets” (Simon 2002, p. 
414). However, in the New Economy there is also a well documented 
trend (for instance in Roberts 2004) to the proliferation of project-
based firms as shown in Figure 1.   
An advantage of taking the above perspective on the New and 
Chandlerian Economies consists in the fact that it constitutes a 
coherent framework for an understanding of the mutants of the firm. 
In this perspective both the Chandlerian multidivisional form and the 
New Economy firm must be perceived as mutants as opposed to the 
tightly coupled, highly centralized hierarchy. My argument, in 
accordance with Powell (2001), is that there have been two major 
evolutions in the structure of organizations. The first begun at the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and led to the birth of the 
multidivisional firm. Some 10 years ago we entered a second period 
of organizational change. Following this line of reasoning I argue that 
two kinds of mutants of the capitalist firm can be distinguished: the 
M-form and the New Economy firm.19 
 
19 Note that the firm form I call the New Economy mutant was referred to by 
Mintzberg (1979) as adhocracy. By that he meant such an organizational 
configuration that is complex and non-standardized, and has a project-based 
structure in which the managers do not control in the sense of direct 
supervision. Interestingly, as early as 1979, Mintzberg had already identified 
almost all the features I explored in Section 2. However, he noted that all 
other organizational configurations he distinguished are either passé or 
simply current, but that the adhocracy “is clearly tomorrow’s” structure 
(Mintzberg 1983, p. 275). Apparently Mintzberg’s ‘tomorrow’ is our ‘today’. 
What is of importance is that the Mintzbergian organizational configuration 
theory and his five categories are not in contradiction with my concept of 
mutants of the firm. The point is that I have a broader, rather more 
historical perspective as regards the evolution of a firm, while Mintzberg is 
interested in analyzing organizations according to some concrete criterion 
(elements of the configurations) such as job specialization, behavior 
formalization, and so on (Minzberg 1981, Appendix). I think that Mintzberg’s 
configurations and my concept of mutants are useful simply for different 
theoretical purposes.   
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In what sense should the new mutant be seen as an efficient 
response to the changes in the New Economy?20 Firstly, it is an 
efficient organizational solution to the decomposition of complex 
problems into simpler sub-problems. As highlighted by Foss and 
Foss (2002) firms confront new problems, or at least, the architecture 
of the existing problems has changed in the New Economy. These 
can be referred to as ill-structured problems in a Simonian sense 
(Simon 1973). Simon argues that any ill-structured problem can be 
made structured (solvable) through certain process of 
transformation: the key point in the resolution of these problems 
consists in the decomposition of the problems into sub-problems 
(Simon 1962). The New Economy mutant may be adopted to solve 
this problem by imposing structure on ill-structured problems. It 
seems that firms resolve this problem by the decomposition of the 
organization into elements, i.e., project-based teams. That is, the 
decomposition of the complex problem may be obtained through the 
decomposition of the organization. In this sense the new mutant 
represents an efficient solution to the complex problems that arise in 
the New Economy. 
On the other hand, with relation to hypercompetition, 
uncertainty has increased in the New Economy. As Langlois (2003) 
argues, environmental uncertainty requires some form of buffering. 
There exist two types of buffers, namely human cognitive capabilities 
(management) and the price system (market). The types of buffers to 
be used depend on space and time. In a highly uncertain 
environment such as the New Economy modular systems have 
comparative advantage over non-modular ones. Being more modular, 
the new mutant-firm is more suitable to the requirements of the New 
Economy.  
To summarize, the New Economy mutant has brought about 
changes within the firm in order to solve complex problems and 
buffer uncertainty in an efficient way.  
 
4. The distinctive mark of a firm 
 
20 In this paper I build upon the concept of the contingent fit as proposed in 
contingency and configuration theories, organizational ecology, and 
transaction costs economics. The reason is that, following Langlois (2003), it 
is technological changes that are the driving force behind the evolution of 
firm organization – although of course there have been a number of 
contributing factors and an interplay between them. It is worth noting that, 
according to Nickerson and Zenger (2002), organizational changes often 
seem difficult to explain as merely responses to exogenous environmental 
changes. They suggest that under certain conditions, even in the absence of 
environmental change, managers may stimulate change in organizational 
structure. 




Both the M-form and the New Economy firm are mutants as 
opposed to Zenger’s view (Zenger 2002) which regards the latter as a 
discrete governance structure. Zenger, by focusing exclusively on a 
unique bundle of complementary features of the new mutant-firm, 
neglects its most important characteristic. The important thing is 
that both the M-form and the new mutant-firm are essentially of the 
same nature, i.e., they are firm organizations. To put it differently, 
mutants exhibit to a certain extent different characteristics while 
retaining the same distinctive feature. This being said, we have to 
investigate the question of what is common in all mutants of the 
firm. So, what is this distinctive mark of a firm? An understanding of 
the essence of a firm requires us to establish the unique attribute of 
a firm, i.e., that which exclusively characterizes it as opposed to the 
market and hybrid form.  
In my view, a distinction between coordination mechanisms 
(devices) and arenas of coordination may be useful in this 
understanding. I have argued elsewhere (Kapás 2002) that the firm, 
like the market, should be considered an arena rather than a 
mechanism of coordination. The firm is a complex of coordinating 
devices (Ménard 1994), i.e., it encompasses diverse coordinating 
mechanisms. Mutants of the firm differ from one another in the mix 
of various coordinating mechanisms21 they comprise. For instance 
the M-form uses more market-like coordinating mechanisms (high-
powered incentives) as opposed to the highly centralized hierarchy, 
and the same applies for the new mutant as compared with the M-
form. The tendency is clear: moving from the tightly coupled, 
centralized hierarchy towards the M-form, and then towards the New 
Economy mutant, the mix of the coordinating mechanisms shifts 
towards encompassing more and more high-powered incentives.22  
Let me turn back to the question of what makes a firm a firm. 
Coase (1937) was the first to discuss this issue. He argued that “the 
distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price 
mechanism” (Coase 1937, p. 389). By this he referred to the 
authority relation as creating the essence of the firm.23 Without 
 
21 Coordinating mechanisms are authority, command, price system, trust, 
reciprocity, etc.   
22 This means that there is a relatively large area within which high-powered 
incentives may be applied within a firm. The question of what limits the use 
of market-like coordinating devices will be addressed in Section 5. 
23 Note that many argue (among others Langlois and Foss 1999) that Coase 
was wrong to consider the suppression of the price system as the 
distinguishing feature of the firm by arguing that the two things Coase 
referred to are not the same. The counter-argument is that firms use transfer 
(shadow) prices, which aim to imitate market prices within the firm. Note 
also that transfer prices are not (true) market prices and their use serves, 
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giving a clear-cut definition, he understood authority as the 
relationship between the employee and employer (entrepreneur): the 
entrepreneur exercises direction, and employees agree to obey to 
him/her within certain limits (ibid. p. 391). This concept of authority 
was formalized by Simon (1951) and has become common in the 
literature: authority refers to the manager’s right to direct the 
workers within their “zone of acceptance”. Here authority is based 
upon the control and monitoring of individual efforts. 
The organizational context is, in several respects, different in 
the New Economy mutants, where employees are given a great 
amount of autonomy and a number of decision-making rights are 
delegated. In this case, as a number of scholars (Foss 2002, Brusoni 
2003) argue, the Coasean-Simonian view of authority is too narrow. 
This is “because it implies that the boss directs the worker’s actions 
in detail, based on a complete knowledge of the worker’s action set, 
and because it implicitly asserts that the boss is always at least as, 
or more, knowledgeable about what actions should optimally be 
carried out” (Foss 2002, p. 19). Consequently, the concept of 
authority has to be extended. A broader concept of authority should 
take into account the fact that decision rights are delegated in firms. 
Authority in a broader sense is about deciding what decisions can be 
delegated to employees or project partners when decomposing 
complex problems into simpler sub-problems, and about deciding 
where to set the limits to the discretion allowed to agents to whom 
decisions are delegated (Foss and Foss 2002). By delegating the 
solution of each sub-problem to specialists in teams, the foundations 
of authority are to be found not only in the ownership of tangible 
assets.  
This being said, the question of whether authority (in a 
broader sense) is a distinguishing mark of a firm arises. The answer 
is not obviously ‘yes’ since markets and, especially, hybrids are also 
infused with a lower level of authority.24 To provide an answer, 
understanding authority as a coordination device, as proposed 
above, is of paramount importance. My argument is that, despite the 
penetration of market-like coordinating devices, authority remains 
the primordial coordinating mechanism within the firm.  
Case studies in the organizational theory literature provide 
support for this argument. Let me cite an example, namely the 
                                                                                                                             
partly, other purposes than ensuring efficient resource allocation. 
Nevertheless, they are much more similar to market prices than to 
commands used exclusively by firms. 
24 Many scholars argue and provide evidence for the fact that a kind of 
authority is observable in hybrids (Ménard 2004) and in market contracts 
(Stinchcombe 1985). 
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Oticon case that is discussed in Foss (2003).25 The Danish firm 
Oticon, founded in 1904, is one of the world market leaders in 
hearing aids. The company became world famous for radical 
organizational transformation in the early 1990s. The background 
was the loss of competitive advantage during the 1980s. The new 
organizational structure, namely the “spaghetti organization”, was a 
loosely coupled, almost 100% project-based organization 
characterized by ambiguous job boundaries and extensive delegation 
of responsibilities to autonomous teams. The significant thing is that 
the firm was entirely organized on the initiatives of firm members: 
anybody had the right to initiate a project, and employees could 
decide which projects they would join. Project managers were free to 
manage the project in all respects: they were given a great amount of 
decision-making power and the right to negotiate salaries. 
Nevertheless, all development projects initiated by individuals had to 
receive approval from the Project and Product Committee. 
The implementation of the new structure had marked and 
rapid effects on performance. However, the major problem was that 
the Project and Product Committee, because it had the ultimate 
decision-making power could veto any project initiated by the teams. 
That is, in spite of delegating many decision-making rights, the CEO 
possessed very considerable decision-making powers, and could 
intervene in projects, for instance by closing down them. Finally, 
these interventions led to severe performance problems, and 
consequently, the restructuring of the firm towards a more 
hierarchical form.  
A lesson from this case is that since the Project and Product 
Committee could overrule the employees, authority has supremacy 
over the other coordinating devises used within the firm and it can 
never vanish inside the firm unlike in the market. That is the 
distinctive mark of a firm. This also implies, as Foss (2001) argues, 
that centralized coordination (authority) is always needed within 
firms.26  
It is worth noting that the ideas developed in the system 
theory, although originating from another perspective, seem to 
largely support the above argument on the “essence” of the firm. A 
firm as a complex system requires rules (Foster 2005) which change 
through time. As a result of this process there are rules that are 
common to all firms and those that are unique to particular firms. 
The common rules constituting the distinctive mark of the firm 
concern the connective structure, i.e., hierarchy (authority) of the 
 
25 Other cases can be found, among others, in Lindkvist (2004) and Kakihara 
(2004).  
26 According to Foss (2001), the reasons why authority is always needed are 
as follows: (1) the need for urgent coordination, (2) decisive information, (3) 
economies of scale in decision-making, (4) economies of scale in monitoring. 
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firm; these rules serve to connect together the elements of the 
system. In addition, Mesarovic et al. (1970) put the emphasis on the 
multilevel character of the firm’s hierarchical system. They build 
upon the view that the decision-making units in the multilevel 
systems possess discretion; the extent of this discretion being 
precisely where the M-form and the new mutant differ. Moreover, the 
concept of authority in a broader sense is built upon the concept of 
discretion, as argued above.  
Quite naturally, this approach is connected to March and 
Simon’s (1958) treatise on conflict-resolution27 within the firm which 
directs our attention to an additional lesson taken from the Oticon 
case: after a certain period and even despite the first success, the 
“spaghetti organization” was partially abandoned and it was 
gradually superseded by the previous, apparently more stable 
organizational structure. Obviously, this has to do with what was 
proposed in Cyert and March (1963). The quasi-resolution of conflict 
– according to which firms function with considerable conflicts of 
interests between groups, but do not necessarily resolve these 
conflicts – is becoming an even more severe problem in the project-
based organizational form. Since this firm form tends to give a birth 
to a larger number of conflicts between teams, in order to achieve a 
consistency between teams’ goals, top management (the Project and 
Product Committee) must retain the ultimate decision-making right 
for itself. This points to the fact that the extent to which high-
powered incentives can be used within the firm is constrained. 
 
5. How radical can the New Economy mutant be? 
 
The above view needs to be analyzed in more detail. The 
major question is what limits the use of high-powered incentives 
within a firm. Not surprisingly, several factors intertwine.  
As mentioned above, the New Economy favors those systems 
that are capable of decomposing complex problems into simpler sub-
problems, and the new mutant-firm is such a system. Moreover, the 
process of decomposition cannot reach a situation whereby all sub-
problems include all and only the elements that are independent of 
each other (perfect decomposability), i.e., complex problems are only 
nearly decomposable28 (Simon 1996). As Simon argues near-
decomposability is a permanent feature of organizational 
architecture, consequently, over non-decomposable problems top 
 
27 Mesarovic et al. (1970) have developed a formalized theory of conflict-
resolution and coordination in multilevel hierarchical firms.  
28 In a nearly-decomposable system the interactions among sub-systems are 
weak, but not negligible (Simon 1962, p. 129). 
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management (authority) reserves ultimate decision-making rights for 
itself.  
Another limit is what Williamson (1996, p. 150) identified as 
the impossibility of selective intervention. Selective intervention 
refers to the promises of the managers to intervene in the affairs 
delegated to the employees only with good cause, i.e. when the 
processes take an undesirable turn. Williamson argues that selective 
intervention is impossible; that is, the promise of the manager to 
overrule the employee’s decision only in difficult situations is not 
credible because these promises are unenforceable. This means, as is 
also seen in the Oticon case, that the person who has the ultimate 
decision rights can always control and overrule employees.  
In addition, there are costs associated with using fewer 
administrative devices (authority), such as agency costs. These costs 
also constrain the extent to which market-like coordinating devices 
can be used within the firm. Decision rights should be delegated in 
such a way that the advantages from delegation – which result in a 
better use of local knowledge – counterbalance the costs of 
delegation, i.e., losses from agency (Jensen and Meckling 1992). 
Assuming that the agency costs increase monotonically and the costs 
owing to poor knowledge decrease monotonically as more decision 
rights are allocated to subordinates, the optimal decentralization of 
decision rights (authority) can not occur at a point at which decision 
rights are completely decentralized. This argument is illustrated in 
Figure 3.  
 Figure 3. The optimal decentralization of decision rights  
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1992, p. 263) 
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Modularity also limits the extent to which high-powered 
mechanisms can be applied. At a more abstract level modularity 
refers to the degree to which a system’s components can be 
separated and recombined without a significant loss of functionality 
(Shilling 2000, p. 315).29 Since all systems exhibit some degree of 
modularity, the question to be raised is not whether a system is 
modular, but to what degree it is modular. 
More recently modularity theory has been applied to social 
organizations as well. As Langlois (2002) argues, a market is an 
extremely modular organizational form, while “firms arise as islands 
of non-modularity in a sea of modularity” (Langlois 2002, p. 34). 
Nevertheless, when the firm uses more high-powered incentives like 
the New Economy mutant-firm, it becomes infused with more 
modularity. That is, from a modularity point of view the difference 
between the firm and the market is a matter of degree, rather than 
being a matter of kind. But, modularity is constrained inside the firm 
because of the synergistic specificity of the firm’s components, which 
means that the firm as a whole can perform better compared to when 
it is (to too large an extent) decomposed (Schilling 2000). So, the firm 




Based on the above, one conclusion is that the firm cannot use 
the coordinating devices in any arbitrary mix.30 Although the scope 
for applying high-powered incentives is relatively large, authority 
remains primary. This is the distinctive mark of a firm. When – 
compared to a previous state – firm organization is infused with a 
large number of market-like incentives that profoundly affect the 
whole firm organization, a mutant emerges. This can be dramatically 
illustrated in the examples of both the M-form and the New Economy 
mutant.  
The New Economy mutant has just superseded the M-form by 
applying more high-powered incentives within the boundaries of the 
firm. Several facts suggest that the M-form uses market-like 
coordinating devices to the detriment of command and 
administrative devices: division managers are given legitimacy and 
 
29 The components of a modular system are relatively independent of one 
another and are easily combinable with the others (Baldwin and Clark 2000). 
30 As seen in the Oticon case, when applying a market-like coordinating 
mechanism to too large an extent within the firm, there arises an efficiency 
loss and the firm reverts to a more hierarchical structure. Note also that, in 
opposition to this view, Grandori (1997) argues that coordinating 
mechanisms can be combined arbitrarily along a continuum. 
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power, their rewards are based on division profits, there is 
competition for financial resources between divisions, and so on. 
Accordingly, compared to the highly centralized hierarchy, the M-
form’s divisions are encouraged to behave in a more entrepreneurial 
way, not as departments in the centralized hierarchy, but rather like 
the project-based teams in the New Economy mutant-firm. That is, 
the tendency is clear: the technological-institutional process of 
change from the middle of the 19th century induces a shift from the 
highly centralized hierarchy towards the M-form, and then towards 
the New Economy mutant by changing the mix of the coordinating 
mechanisms towards encompassing more and more high-powered 
incentives. Accordingly, mutants of the firm (M-form and the New 
Economy firm) should be conceived as comprising a varied mix of low 
and high-powered incentives.  
Taking into account the character of the whole process, the 
novelty of the New Economy mutant as well as the New Economy 
itself should not be overestimated: the New Economy should not be 
mystified as it is in the media. The New Economy has been described 
by the media as ‘the Internet age’, ‘the IT revolution’, and ‘the digital 
era’. These terms seem to have an exaggerated connotation. As 
suggested above, IT, the Internet and telecommunication 
technologies can be paralleled with the technological innovations – 
including the telegraph, the development of continuous process 
machinery, the refinement of interchangeable parts manufacture, 
and the railroad (Chandler 1977) – that took place from the mid 19th 
century, giving birth to the M-form. Similarly, the Internet and IT led 
to the new mutant-firm. Both the M-form and the new mutant-firm 
have been appropriate responses to the requirements of their own 
age and have comparative advantage in particular economic systems.  
As a consequence, those segments of an economy that are 
loosely interwoven with the New Economy may not favor the new 
mutant, and, as a result a number of firms may retain a more 
hierarchical structure. Recall that it took almost half a century for 
the M-form to become a dominant form. Apparently, we are just at 
the beginning of the New Economy, and we do not know how much 
time it will take for the new mutant to spread in the economy, if 
indeed this form will prove at all viable. It is unclear now whether the 
entire economy is disaggregating as proposed by Zenger and 
Hesterley (1997), or whether the current period will, finally, settle 
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